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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
RULON R. WEST,
Plaintiff and Appellant~
Case No.

vs.

TERRY R. WEST and FLORA E.
WEST,
Defendants and Respondents.

9870

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This was an action brought by a partner against
his two co-partners for dissolution and winding up of
partnership affairs, an accounting by the managing
partner, and distribution of partnership property remaining after the payment of partnership liabilities.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Neither of the respondent partners objected to
dissolution of the partnership. The lower court, on
1
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appellant's motion and over respondents' objections,
appointed a receiver to take possession of partnership
assets, manage them pending sale, sell them, and wind
up partnership affairs. Partnership assets (primarily
a motel, trailer park and trailer sales office) were sold,
whereafter the court appointed a special master to take
evidence with respect to the accounting to be rendered
by respondent Terry R. West. The court made some
adjustments as to amounts due from the partners to
each other and entered a judgment (on the basis of an
interlocutory summary judgment entered at an earlier
stage of the case) that all funds of the partnership after
payment of creditors other than partners, and deduction
of the costs and fees of the receivership were to be paid
"4oro to Rulon West, 40ro to Terry West and 20%
to Flora E. West." In other words, the court ruled that
appellant was not entitled to return of amounts he had
contributed to partnership capital, nor to amounts he
had loaned to the partnership during operation of the
motels, regardless of the disparity between his payments
and respondents' payments.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of that part of the judgment establishing amounts to be distributed to the partners, and entry of a decree that the receiver pay all
liabilities to partners, including capital contributions
and loans before making distribution to the parties in
the proportions shown; also that the plaintiff Rulon
2
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R. West be paid interest as provided in the partnership
articles.
In event the court does not enter a decree as requested, then appellant seeks remand to the District
Court for trial of fact issues bearing upon interpretation of the articles of partnership, and dissolution agreements, and whether amounts paid into the partnership
by appellant were capital contributions, or loans, or
gifts.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The primary dispute has been over the extent to
which the partners are entitled to participate in distribution upon winding up of partnership affairs. Inasmuch as the lower court did not try the issue but
granted a summary judgment with respect to the distribution, it must have concluded that there were no
material facts in dispute. This statement of facts, therefore, will refer severally to the pleadings, to undisputed
facts, and to facts lying within an area of dispute.
[References to pages of the official record will be
prefaced by "R", and those to depositions by the name
of the deponent. Because of the identity of family name,
the appellant will sometimes be called "Rulon," the
respondents "Terry," and "Flora."]

The Pleadings
The complaint (R. 1-10) was in three counts. The
first alleged a dispute as to the meaning of the partner-
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ship articles with respect to distribution upon winding
up of the partnership, and asked for a declaratory
judgment; the second alleged dissolution of the partnership by appellant and a refusal by Terry West to
wind up partnership affairs; the third alleged disagreement between appellant and Terry, a disregard by
Terry of the appellant's requests, instances of Terry's
improper management, and his failure to render an
accounting, the prayer being for a decree of dissolution and court assistance in winding up partnership
affairs.
In his answer (R. 11-13) Terry admitted the partnership agreement and that he claimed to be entitled
to 40 per cent of all partnership assets, including contributions and advances made at any time by the appellant; he denied there had been a dissolution by appellant
and alleged that on April 2, 1960, the parties had
entered into a written dissolution agreement [apparently signed by appellant on March 31], annexed to
his answer as Exhibit 2 ( R. 19-22) ; he admitted that
appellant had paid approximately $148,000.00 into
the· partnership by way of either contributions or loans
but alleged that all of the money paid in by the plaintiff
was "capital contribution." As an affirmative defense
Terry repleaded the dissolution agreement of April
2, 1960, as well as an agreement supplemental to it
(R. 18) from which he concluded that the appellant
by those "and other written instruments" had "transferred and reaffirmed transfer to defendant, and defendant accepted same, relied upon same, and mate·

4
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rially altered and changed his entire plans and future
plans, and changed his position, and accepted said
transfer." Terry also alleged that on or about April 2,
1960, by the supplemental agreement, appellant had
transferred 40 per cent of his interest to Terry, and
that because of this Terry had entered into the dissolution agreement. By a counterclaim and amended counterclaim (R. 173-17, 23-27) Terry sought 40 per cent
of appellant's capital investment and all advances made
by the appellant, as well as relief in connection with
a separate transaction.
In her answer ( R. 28-30) Flora claimed 20 per
cent of all appellant's contributions to the partnership
"whether at its inception or thereafter and whether
by the way of capital contributions or by way of advances to the partnership" and that appellant "is not
entitled to any return of contributions or advances;"
she also alleged execution of the dissolution agreement
dated March 31, 1960 (R. 19-22) and that the agreement had been "ratified, approved and confirmed by"
her; she admitted that Rulon contributed substantially
all of the initial capital of the partnership. In her
second defense Flora took the position that by the
partnership agreement dated October 15, 1957, she
received a 20 per cent interest in "all of the partnership
property howsoever the same was received by the partnership, including capital contributions, whether made
at the inception of said partnership or thereafter, and
the undivided profits and income therefrom, and plaintiff by said contract of partnership is estopped to deny
5
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or claim otherwise." In her third defense she stated that
on October 15, 1957, the date of the original articles
of partnership, appellant had made a gift to her of
20 per cent of all the contributions made to the partnership by him. She stated that in reliance on it she had
materially altered her position, but she did not say how.
In a fourth defense she stated that the instrument in
writing dated on or about the 31st day of March, 1960,
and the one dated the 2nd day of April, 1960 (R. 1922, 18), served to confirm, ratify, and approve the 20
per cent interest given by the original partnership agreement. Respondent Flora did not contend that either the
agreement of April 2, 1960, or the supplement to it,
itself operated as a gift in her favor.

Undisputed Facts
Prior to September, 1957, Rulon R. West, appellant here, occasionally had expressed interest in purchasing a motel. About that time his son, Terry, saw
an advertisement for the sale of the El Rancho Motel
in Murray and reported it to Rulon (Terry 3; Rulon
7). Thereafter, at Rulon's request, Terry made an
offer to purchase the motel, which was accepted (Terry
4).
A contract was entered into which Rulon and Terry
were purchasers, and a down payment of $47,500.00
was made by Rulon (Terry 5-6) . On about October
15, Rulon, Terry and Flora executed "Articles of
Partnership" under which they began to operate the
motel. The interest in the real estate was contributed

6
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to the capital of the partnership. A copy of the partnership agreement is annexed to the complaint as Exhibit
"A" (R. 6-10), and to this brief as Appendix "A".
The motel business was operated by the partnership as such until about March 21, 1960, when Rulon's
attorneys sent a letter (R. 5) to Terry announcing his
withdrawal and requesting Terry to wind up the partnership and distribute ::1.ssets.
The partners negotiated toward a dissolution
agreement. On March 31, 1960, Rulon executed the
dissolution agreement and it was executed within a
day or two thereafter by Terry (R. 12, par. 4). The
agreement was not executed by Flora until sometime
in January, 1961-after the present legal action had
been initiated (Flora 20). The agreement is at R. 1922, is an exhibit to Rulon R. West's deposition, and
is Appendix "B" to this brief.
At about the time the dissolution agreement was
signed by Terry (just before, according to his answer,
R. 12, par. 3) Terry's attorney presented to Rulon
what purported to be a supplemental agreement, dated
April 2, 1960, the main purport of which was that
"with respect to the 407o interest" acquired by Terry
West, and the interest acquired by Flora West (whatever those interests were) it was agreed that they had
been acquired by gift and that Rulon would file a gift
tax return and absorb any losses. A copy of the "supplemental agreement" is annexed to Terry's answer
(R. 18) and is Appendix "C" to this brief.

7
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Although the dissolution agree1nent and its supplement had been executed by Terry and Rulon by
April 2, 1960, partnership affairs were not wound up
and on January 6, 1961, the complaint was filed in this
action.

Facts Which May be in Dispute
After the action was initiated interrogatories and
depositions were used by all parties. There are conflicting stories as to what the partners had in mind
when certain funds were advanced to the partnership
by Rulon, as well as to the circumstances under which
the dissolution agreement and supplemental agreement
were signed.
Some of the facts set out in this subdivision may
not be "disputed" in the usual sense, the versions related
by the respective parties being consistent in many respects. But the coloration is different and the possible
impression upon a fact-finder (had the trial court permitted a fact-finder to hear the evidence) is important
in connection with this appeal. The lower court's judgment nominally was based upon the prior discovery as
well as the pleadings (R. 107, 110).
Terry, who had been through business management
school and graduated in accounting, drew the agreement, according to Rulon, though Rulon suggested
that it might be polished up by an attorney (Rulon 10).
The division of profit and loss was changed from 50-50
to 40-40-20 to permit Flora to participate (Terry 7).

8
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Flora didn't know she was going to be a partner until
the parties met to sign the agreement (Flora 9) , and
neither did Rulon (Rulon 11). Terry says he understood the capital of the partnership was to be distributed
40-40-20 on distribution no matter who contributed
or in what proportions (R. 7-8). But Flora at times
says "gifts" of percentages made by Rulon were not
made until Rulon signed the supplemental agreement
in Murray on April 2, 1960 (R. 13).
There are a number of activities o£ Terry and Flora
which, to a fact-finder, would have significant bearing
on construction of the original articles of partnership.
For example, notwithstanding Terry's claimed "understanding" that all of the capital from whatever source
would be distributed 40-40-20, accountant Terry maintained separate capital accounts, and amounts contributed and loaned by Rulon were credited to Rulon's capital
(Terry 8) ; they remained so credited until after Rulon
gave notice of dissolution. On June 15, 1960, Terry
made a charge against Rulon's capital account and
transferred 60 per cent of his capital credit to Terry
and Flora, the amounts being approximately $30,000.00
to Flora and $59,000.00 to Terry (R. 51, No. 5; R. 54,
58, No. 5). This was done, according to Terry, on the
basis of the dissolution agreement (Appendix "B").
Neither Terry nor Flora contributed to the beginning capital (Terry 12, R. 6, par. 3) but after the
partnership was in operation Terry "contributed" part
of his salary (ex parte) by taking credits to his capital
9
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account (Terry 12). After the partnership began Rulon
"loaned" to the partnership (Rulon 12) approximately
$100,000.00, which Terry says was "invested" Terry
19). When money was needed Terry would ask Rulon
for it; Terry and Flora gave Rulon an "opportunity
of additional investment" by "not hollering when he
put the money in" (Terry 20). When Rulon received
this opportunity and took advantage of it he was given
a credit to his capital account (Terry 20), but it was
Terry's understanding that each time he obtained money
from Rulon 40 per cent was to be his (Terry 21). The
provision in the articles requiring the partners to consent to increased contributions to capital was for the
"protection" of the three partners (Terry 22) , but
Rulon was to receive credit for his contributions or
loans only as long as the business was opera ted (R. 23),
and Terry at one time interpreted the agreement as
requiring him to repay Rulon in event of loss (Terry
28). Terry also testified that he construed the partnership contract as an agreement by Rulon to make a gift;
and that he would not have to repay Rulon for losses,
but that he and Flora would join in bearing the loss
of what Rulon had given them (Terry 28).
Accountant Terry kept all the partnership books
(Terry 23) but no entry was ever made in any of them
showing that Terry and Flora were to get part of
Rulon's money until late spring of 1960, after notice
of dissolution (Terry 33).
The letter of March 21, 1960, in which Rulon stated

10
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that he was withdrawing was "the second time other
than the-or the first time other than the original partnership he showed an indication of expecting only a
40 per cent return of capital" (Terry 38). Between the
signing of the partnership articles and the date of the
letter Rulon had done nothing to indicate that he expected to get back only 40 per cent (Terry 38) . Moreover, Terry didn't regard any "gift" as having been
made in the original partnership agreement, but only
as having been "promised" (Terry 40) . After the partnership agreement had been entered into Terry had
given financial statements relating to his own affairs
but they did not show any interest in Rulon's capital
account (Terry 41).
Sometimes when Rulon advanced money he said he
was "investing," according to Terry, and sometimes
he didn't say anything, but just made the money available when requested. Terry had no letters from Rulon
indicating that he was "investing" (Terry 50) . Rulon
did show the contributions or loans as his asset (R. 51).
During the time he was operating the partnership and
keeping its books Terry did not furnish any partnership returns and there was no division of profits (Terry
52).

Flora didn't know much about the partnership,
how it was operated, or how it came into existence. She
took the view that her 20 per cent was given to her at
Murray by the supplemental agreement of April 2,
1960, not by the partnership articles (Flora 13). Morell
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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over, she understood that tied to the "gift" was the
proposition that Terry was to buy the interest of Rulon
in the partnership, and that all papers were signed
except for the paper indicating how Terry would pay
for Rulon's interest (Flora 13). The only thing Flora
had ever been concerned about was profit and loss, because she didn't think the business would be sold. She
might have to dig up some money to meet the losses
(Flora 14-15). She also understood that she was to
get part of the assets, but the understanding about her
receiving 20 per cent of Rulon's capital came solely
from the partnership agreement, since the parties hadn't
discussed the matter (Flora 17). [The inconsistency
is Flora's not ours]. There were no meetings at which
the partners agreed that additional investments might
be made by Rulon (Flora 17-18).
Flora did make "loans" to the partnership (Flora
21) for which Terry gave her notes. But the notes
were destroyed by her or Terry after they were paid
off. She was not requested to "invest" in the partnership (Flora 21). Rulon didn't examine the books, according to her, and he never told her that she and Terry
were to have 60 per cent of his payments into the partnership. When Terry came to him for additional
moneys, it was Rulon's understanding and Terry's too,
that notes were to be delivered. He discussed this with
Terry many times and kept copies of correspondence
relating to notes; moreover, he has witnesses to prove
it. The notes were to bear interest at 5 per cent, a matter
which was talked about on numerous occasions (Rulon

12
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12-13) . But he never did receive any interest. Rulon

had requested on numerous occasions that the notes be
executed and delivered to him (Rulon 25-27) .
Terry's receiving part of Rulon's investment (or
loans) to the partnership as an advancement of his
"inheritance" was first discussed in Murray with Mr.
E. L. Schoenhals (Terry's lawyer) a few hours before
Rulon was to leave for South America on a trip (Rulon
31). Rulon signed the dissolution agreement (Rulon
34). The supplemental agreement of April 2, 1960,
was "sprung on" Rulon at Murray just at the time
the dissolution agreement was signed (Rulon 34). Rulon
was surprised by the supplemental agreement because
it had never been discussed (Rulon 36). Terry's attorney at that time worked upon Rulon's passion and
pressure for time, talking to him about inheritance and
taxes when he was in a great hurry to leave (Rulon
37-38) . Moreover, part of the understanding was that
Rulon would get 6 per cent interest on all the money
he left in the partnership. The luncheon meeting was
the first time Rulon saw the supplemental agreement,
and he neither received nor was promised anything for
it (Rulon 62).
Accountant Terry's keeping of partnership books
was slipshod with respect to things other than Rulon's
capital. He purchased a car in the company name which
was a "contribution" to capital (Terry 12, 18), but it
was his car because he made the down payment (Terry
18), and was the company's car for income tax pur-

13
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poses (Terry 18), and if the partners decided to go
strictly by the partnership articles, probably the car
would be a company car (Terry 32) .
Although Terry treated Rulon's advances to the
partnership as contributions to capital in which he and
Flora were to share, he "borrowed" money from Flora
on at least four different occasions (R. 47), and then
paid the money back to her out of partnership funds
with 8 per cent interest.
On about June 15, 1960, Terry gave to Flora,
out of Rulon's capital account, a credit of $30,000.00,
which is shown in his answer to interrogatories as "recording transaction between R. R. West and Terry
R. West made in April, 1960" ( R. 54) . At the same
time Terry took credit on his own capital account in
the amount of $59,000.00.
Rulon has shown the El Rancho as one of his
assets in financial statements furnished by him (R. 61,
66, No. 1 (b) ) . He didn't know Terry was borrowing
money from Flora (R. 72, No. 31).
All of the above matters were In record at the
time the appellant moved for summary judgment on
May 23, 1961). The trial court not only denied the
plaint~ff's motion for summary judgment but took the
position that there were no material facts that could
lead to the construction contended for by appellant. It
held the defendants entitled to judgment· as a matter
of law that they receive 60 per cent of all amounts

14
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that had been paid into the partnership, whether by
way of contribution or loan, by appellant. It is not
clear whether the court was relying upon the partnership itself (Appendix "A") or upon the dissolution
agreement and supplement to it signed by two of the
partners on about April 2, 1960 (Appendixes "B" and
"C"). At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment (R. 96) appellant objected to the introduction
of evidence and resisted an attempt by the trial judge
to have appellant proceed forthwith to trial for the
purpose of determining the disputed questions of fact
(R. 99). Appellant pointed out to the court the material
issues of fact which needed to be tried (R. 89-102).
When the defendants purported to rely on the agreement of April 2, 1960, the appellant offered to show
Terry's undue influence in obtaining it (R. 97). It
was pointed out to the court (R. 98-100) that the appellant's position would be that the "additional amounts
that were paid by Rulon R. West to Terry R. West
were not and never intended to be contributions to
capital, that they were loans to the partnership, and
that the evidence in the case of a trial of this thing
would so show." It was also pointed out that one of the
agreements of Terry West in consideration of the supplemental agreement was that Terry would buy out
Rulon's interest. in the partnership, which he never
did do.
When the appellant refused to enter into a courtsuggested settlement with respondents, the court entered an order that the assets of the partnership would

15
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be divided 40 per cent to Rulon, 40 per cent to Terry
"by way of a gift" and 20 per cent to Flora "by way
of a gift" after payment of liabilities to outsiders. This
applied to all advancements to the partnership by Rulon
whether contributions to capital or loans (R. 105-106).
On June 29, 1962, the court appointed a special
master to hear evidence concerning partnership accounts. At that time the court withheld from consideraation by the master the amounts that had been standing
in the capital accounts of the partners and the interest
thereon. Thereafter, on January 7, 1963, the special
master filed his report and, consistent with the court's
discretion, did not make any allowance for interest to
the partners on the amounts standing in their capital
accounts despite an express provision in paragraph 4
of the articles. An objection was raised to the master's
report on this ground, among others (R. 165-166), but
the objections were overruled and a final judgment
was entered by the court on February 27, 1963, directing that all assets of the partnership - non-partner
creditors having been paid-would be paid 407o to
Rulon, 40Cfo to Terry, and 20ro to Flora.

16
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ARGUMENT
I

The court erred in directing that the assets of the
partnership be distributed 40 per cent to appellant and
60 per cent to respondents without prior repayment of
loans and capital contributions of the partners.
The decision can find justification only in some
agreement between the parties; and the only agreements
upon which any reliance has been placed by respondents
were the partnership articles, the April 2, 1960, dissolution agreement, and the agreement supplementing it.
There is no help for respondents in the statutes.
(a) Under the Utah Partnership A.ct liabilities to
partners are to be paid prior to distribution~ in the
absence of an agreement to the contrary.

The Utah Partnership Act in at least two sections
recognizes the right of obligee-partners to be paid prior
to distribution. The first, 48-1-15 Utah Code Annotated
1953, provides:
"The rights and duties of the partners in relation to the partnership shall be determined, subject to any agreement between them, by the
following rules:
(I) Each partner shall be repaid his contributions, whether by way of capital or advances
to the partnership, and share equally in the
profits and surplus remaining after all liabilities,
including those to partners, are satisfied; and
must contribute towards the losses, whether of
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capital or otherwise, sustained by the partnership according to his share in the profits. * * *
( 3) A partner who in the aid of the partnership makes any payment or advance beyond the
amount of capital which he agreed to contribute
shall be paid interest from the date of the payment or advance. * * *"

Related provisions in 48-1-37 Utah Code Annotated 1953, govern distribution of assets upon dissolution:
"In settling accounts between the partners
after dissolution the following rules shall be
observed, subject to any agreement to the contrary:
( 1) The assets of the partnership are:

(a) Partnership property.
(b) The contributions of the partners necessary for the payment of all the liabilities specified
in subdivision ( 2) of this section.
( 2) The liabilities of the partnership shall
rank in order of payment, as follows:

(a) Those owing to creditors other than partners.
(b) Those owing to partners other than for
capital and profit.
(c) Those owing to partners in respect of
capital.
( 3) The assets shall be applied in the order
of their declaration in subsection ( 1) of this section to the satisfaction of the liabilities."
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Under the statute itself appellant is clearly entitled to the return of his capital and, indeed, to recoupment of his losses. The taking away of his rights, therefore, must be found in one of the three agreements
appended to this brief; and the agreements do not lend
themselves reasonably to the trial court's interpretation.
(b) The partnership articles do not contain any

agreement that liabilities to partners are not to be paid
prior to distribution.
It is impossible to determine whether the summary
judgment was based upon the articles or the subsequent
agreements. None of them contains an agreement showing an intention to wind up differently than provided
in the statute.
The partnership articles contain two provisions
which, read together, refer to distribution of assets after
winding-up:
"6. The net profits of the business shall be
divided between the partners in the following
proportions: Rulon R. West, forty per cent
( 407o); Terry R. West forty per cent ( 407o)
and Flora E. West twenty per cent ( 207o) .; and
the partners shall in like proportion bear all losses
including loss of capital.

12. * * * If the partnership shall be determined or expire during the joint lives of the
partners, then the partnership shall be wound up~
and the assets distributed in the proportions set
forth in paragraph 6 above hereof." (Emphasis
added.)
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The word "assets" is not defined in the articles
of partnership. Moreover, it could not have been used
in the same sense as in the Partnership Act, which defines assets to include ( 1) partnership property, and
( 2) contributions of the partners necessary for the payment of all partnership liabilities (including liabilities
to partners). If this definition were applicable to the
term as used in the articles, distribution would be contemplated even before non-partner creditors were paid.
The trial court, in effect, construed "assets" to mean
capital remaining after payment of non-partner liabilities, as if "assets" and "capital" were synonymous.
But the agreement itself did not treat the terms as
equivalents. Paragraph 3, referring to capital, calls it
"capital," not "assets." Paragraph 11 refers to the share
of a deceased partner "in the capital and assets"-two
different things. The above usages are co~sistent with
the construction that assets means net assets, i.e., the
surplus remaining after payment of partnership liabilities.
Supporting the conclusions based upon choice of
words are contract provisions. completely inconsistent
with the trial court's interpretation:
Paragraph 3 (b) in defining the capital excludes
sums paid in by partners for "non-capital purposes."
Capital is to consist of beginning capital and sums any
partners "shall with the consent of the others from time
to time contribute for capital purposes," which are to
be "credited to his capital accounts." Maintenance of
20
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capital accounts would seem to indicate that they are
to serve a purpose with respect to the "ownership" interests of the partners. Why maintain capital accounts
if the partners are to share 40-40-20 regardless of credits
to those capital accounts 1
Paragraph 4 provides that interest shall be paid
on amounts in the capital account of each partner, that
it shall accumulate, and that if it is not paid in one year
it shall be made up out of gross profits of succeeding
years. As construed by the trial court the interest is
cumulative only if the obligee-partner manages to get
his hands on it before dissolution-because the partners
are entitled to assets 40-40-20, and anything that happens to be remaining in the partnership at dissolution
is an "asset."
Under paragraph 6 the partners are to "bear all
losses, including loss of capital," in the proportions in
which they share profits. But as interpreted by the trial
court, losses of capital are to be borne by the partner
who contributed the capital, in this case appellant.
Accounting provisions in paragraph 8 were ignored
by the trial court. That paragraph requires an account
to be taken annually, at which time there is to be a
"recouping of any loss of capital," and after adjustments for depreciation and recouping, the net profits
may be divided. A contributing partner is entitled to
an adjustment, and if there has been a loss of capita]
the profits are to be used to pay that partner. But the
trial court would require this adjustment only if made
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before dissolution, and any partner could prevent thr
payment by dissolving the partnership at a propitious
moment, the partnership "assets" then being bundled
up and distributed in the proportions set out in paragraph 6 without regard to any recoupment of loss of
capital.
Paragraph 11 prescribes a method for surviVmg
partners to purchase the interest of a deceased partner.
A formula is set out under which the purchase price is
the amount "at which such share [of the deceased partner] shall stand in the last balance sheet which shall
have been prepared prior to the death of said partner
plus ten per cent (107o) thereof." (Emphasis added).
The "balance sheet" is described in paragraph 8, and
is supposed to make allowance for depreciation and
the recouping of lost capital. Paragraph 11 then requires the surviving partners to pay as the base price
for the deceased partner's interest an amount generally
equivalent to the credit to his capital account. Interest
and 107o is to be added to the base price ..
If Rulon had died, and Flora and Terry had elected
to purchase his interest, there would have been an obligation to pay the amount that should be standing to the
credit of Rulon's capital account, plus ten per cent,
plus interest on the above. lTnder paragraph 12, however, if the deceased partner's interest is not purchased
by the surviving partners pursuant to paragraph 11,
"then the partnership shall be wound up, and the assets
distributed in the proportions set forth in paragraph
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6 above hereof." Under the interpretation adopted by

the trial court, Flora and Terry as surviving partners
could either: (1) purchase Rulon's interest; or (2) get
60c;'o of it for nothing. For under the trial court's "everything is asset" theory, all property in the partnership
at the date of death would be distributed to the partners
40-40-20 regardless of the state of capital accounts,
loans, or contributions. The virtue of simplicity cannot
overcome the sin of incongruity, and application of the
trial court's theory would render paragraph 11 silly
and meaningless.
Admittedly, none of the partners had died, as anticipated in paragraph 11, but under the provisions
of paragraph 12, the partnership is to be wound up
and distributed in exactly the same way whether ( 1)
a partner dies and the option to purchase is not exercised, or ( 2) the partnership "shall be determined or
expire during the joint lives of the partners."
Paragraph 12 contains a provision that the partnership shall be "wound up" and the assets distributed.
Use of the term "wound up" implies an intention that
things will be done that are inherent in the winding
up process. These include payment of obligations, not
only to non-partner creditors but to partners. Duncan
v. Bartle et al.~ 188 Ore. 451, 216 P.2d 1005 (1950),
was an action for dissolution of partnership and adjudi~
cation of accounts. The main issues of the case revolved
about questions of date of dissolution and proper bookkeeping, but the court had this to say about termination,
dissolution and winding up:
23
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"A dissolution of a partnership must precede
its termination. The order of events is ( 1) dissolution, ( 2) winding up, and ( 3) termination.
A dissolution may be brought about by a partner
for any of the causes recited in [the Oregon
Partnership Act], or by a decree of the court
***.Dissolution does not terminate the partnership * * * and does not end completely the
authority of the partners. Termination extinguishes their authority. It is the ultimate of the
winding up and occurs at the conclusion of the
wind up. Dissolution according to [Oregon Partnership Act] leaves the partners with authority
'so far as may be necessary to wind up partnership affairs or to complete transactions begun
but not finished * * *'
"Winding up, of course, means the termination of the assets for the purpose of terminating
the business and discharging the obligations of
the partnership to its creditors and members.}}
(Emphasis added.)
Paragraph 15 deals generally with winding up.
Upon termination of the partnership there is to be a
final accounting of all things relating to the business
and an adjustment of accounts~ whereafter "all stock,
as well as the gains and increases thereof, including
all real and personal property, which shall appear to be
remaining, either in money, goods, wares, fixtures, debts
or otherwise shall be divided between them in the proportions set forth" in paragraph 6. Paragraph 15 had
no meaning for the trial court; it looked at "assets" as
those things which happen to be in the partnership at
the time of dissolution, without regard to adjustments,
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loans, undistributed income, interest, losses, or credits
or debits to any capital accounts. (It did permit some
of the assets to be used to pay non-partner creditors
before making the 40-40-20 split; otherwise "windingup" meant "distributing".)
The basic question involved in construction of the
articles of partnership is whether a provision that
"assets" will be distributed 40-40-20 after winding up
means that liabilities to partners need not be paid; for
48-1-37 Utah Code Annotated 1953 provides that such
liabilities will be paid, subject to "any agreement to the
contrary." We submit that the trial court-in attempting to achieve what it may have deemed a "just" result
-has overreached the sinews of reason, leaving construction of statute and articles strained and sore.
Other courts, in construing partnership agreements,
have been reluctant to give one p~rtner's property to
the others in the absence of some clear expression by
the partners; and the only expression found in the present agreement is a reference in one paragraph to distribution of "assets"-a term easily construed to mean
net assets after the payment of liabilities, including
liabilities to partners.
It has long been recognized that partners' contributions to the partnership should be repaid; a fortiori~
loans by partners to the partnership should be repaid.
Two text-book cases dealing with partnerships and the
nature of the partners' interests are Whitcomb v. Con-
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verse~ 119

Mass. 38, 20 Atl. 311 (1875) and Leserman
v. Bernheimer~ 113 N.Y. 39, 20 N.E. 869 (1889).

Whitcomb v. Converse was an action to compel
contribution to make good the losses of a partnership
which had been organized in 1871 to continue one year.
The articles provided that Converse was to contribute
$25,000.00, receive 7 per cent on it, give such time to the
business as he was able, and receive 1)1 of the net profits;
Whitcomb was to contribute $50,000.00, receive 7 per
cent interest, give all his time, and take 1)1 of the net
profits; Blagdon and Stanton were both to contribute
all their time and receive 1)1 of the net profits each.
Whitcomb put in $25,000.00 of the agreed $50,000.00.
The partnership was dissolved by mutual consent and
Whitcomb authorized to close up the business. He did
so and claimed contribution because of a loss to the
firm of $25,000.00. The court said:

"* * * where, as is usual in an ordinary mercantile partnership, a partnership is created not
merely in profits and losses, but in the property
itself, the property is transferred from the original owners to the partnership, and becomes the
joint property of the latter; a corresponding
obligation arises on the part of the partnership
to pay the value thereof to the individuals who
originally contributed it; such payment cannot
indeed by demanded during the continuance of
the partnership, nor are the contributors, in the
absence of agreement or usage, entitled to interest, but if the assets of the partnership, upon a
final settlement, are insufficient to satisfy this
obligation, all the partners must bear it in the
26
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same proportion as other debts of the partnership. * * *
"The partners were by agreement to receive
each 1,4 of the net profits, and by implication of
law must share the losses in the same proportion.
The capital contributed became the property
of the partnership; and the partnership, consisting of all the partners, became liable to Whitcomb and Converse respectively for the amount
of capital paid in by them."

Leserman v.Bernheimer was an action for settlement of partnership accounts. In discussing the nature
of the interests of the partners in the partnership property the court said:
"The interest of each partner in the partnership property is his share in the surplus after
the partnership accounts are settled and all just
claims satisfied. In this case, by the terms of the
partnership, the partners were to contribute
equally, from the beginning of the partnership
to its dissolution. There is no evidence which
requires or would permit any finding that this
arrangement had been changed, nor are we referred to such finding. It would seem to follow
that the division of profits and charge of losses
should be in the proportion of one-third of each
to each partner. To carry out that mode of adjustment as the one provided by the agreement
of the parties, the advances made by either partner beyond the capital called for by that agreement should be treated as a debt due from the
firm~ paid out of the surplus before any division
is made upon the partnership capital. If that
advance was not in strictness to be regarded as
a debt during the existence of the firm, nor until
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the debts of the firm to third persons were satisfied, it came into that relation the moment those
debts were paid, and the concern, as regards its
businesss and its outside obligations wound up."
(Emphasis added.)
In l(aufer v. Rothman~ 4 N.J. Misc. 1029, 135
Atl. 266 (1926), a bill for construction of a partnership
agreement, the court rejected a contention that a provision for certain shares precluded prior repayment of
capital. The agreement contained the following proVISion:

"At the expiration of one year period of the
co-partnership, and in the event that it is mutually decided to discontinue the partnership,
the said Abraham A. Kaufer is to retain the
aforesaid business, and said Abraham A. Kaufer
is to pay to the said Jacob Rothman lj2 of the
physical assets of the firm at the termination of
the co-partnership.''
The court concluded that the agreement was predicated upon the terms of the agreement that the partners
were to make equal contributions to capital, holding
that there should be an adjustment in the capital
accounts resulting from the fact that Kaufer had
contributed some $13,000.00 as against Rothman's
$1,600.00. The court rejected, as being manifestly unjust, a contention by Rothman that the agreement
should be literally interpreted and that he should be
able to take over the business by payment to Kaufer of
1;2 of the assets without regard to adjustments to the
capital accounts.
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In Vallet v. Pechenik~ 380 Pa. 342, 110 A.2d 221
(1955) , one partner brought an action against the other
partners for an accounting on dissolution. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a provision of the
partnership agreement that one of the partners should
receive, in addition to his salary of $15,000.00 per year,
20 per cent of the annual net profits of the partnership,
calculated annually after deduction of his base salary
and the base salary of another partner, did not apply
to profits made by the partnership on liquidation of
partnership assets when the partnership was dissolved.
The court held that he was to share in those "'profits"
according to his capital acco~nt.
Another case refusing to torture a partnership
agreement into one requiring a contributing partner
to give up his contribution is Glenn v. Weill et al.~ 319
Pa. 380, 179 Atl. 563 ( 1935) . The accounting credited
each partner with a 1/3 interest, but the trial court
found this feature of the accounting to be improper
and ordered distribution according to amounts contributed. The partnership agreement contained nothing
as to contributions to capital but the initial capital was
carried on the books in certain amounts for each partner.
The partner who had contributed nothing on the books
averred that these were not contributions, but payments
for an interest in the business. Both courts found this
contention without merit. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court said:
"Under these circumstances, the I/3 interest
in the business mentioned in the agreement was
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undoubtedly a 1/3 interest in the profits and
losses, and in any surplus after paying off all
the debts."
After quoting the provisions of the Uniform J>artnership Act with respect to dissolution and distribution,
the court went on:

"* * * It necessarily follows that where, as
here, the books of a partnership show an unequal
contribution of capital and there is nothing in
the partnership agreement to show the capital
should not be returned in proportion to the
amounts contributed, that return will be governed by the ordinary rule of law, which is, that
the distribution of capital upon dissolution of
a partnership is in the same proportion in which
such capital was furnished."
Adam v. Obarr_, 123 Cal. App. 36, 11 P.2d II
(1932), was an appeal from a judgment dissolving
a meat-and-grocery partnership, ordering an accounting, and directing the payment of debts, sale of assets,
and distribution among the co-partners. The trial court
determined that although the original agreement was
for respondent's purchase from appellant of a lf2 interest in the business, this had been changed by a later
oral agreement to the effect that respondent should
contribute to the partnership capital an amount equivalent to the original investment of appellant. They found
that he did so contribute in equal amounts. The appellate court held that the trial court had correctly ordered
that after payment of the partnership debts and before
distribution of the remaining assets the withdrawals
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of the partner should be equalized by the payment to
respondent of an amount equivalent to the excess withdrawn by appellant.
The court was wrong, too, insofar as it determined
that the amounts paid into the partnership by Rulon
were "capital contributions" as distinguished from
"loans" and that there was no obligation to repay them.
The presumption is that amounts contributed by Rulon
not required by the partnership articles were loans. See
M & C Creditors Corporation v. Pratt.. 281 N.Y. 804,
24 N.E. 2d 482 (1939), a suit brought by an assignee
of partnership assets and liabilities to recover part of
the amount paid earlier to a deceased partner. The
administrator of the deceased partner contended that
the partner's interest represented a debt of the firm
which, being fixed in amount, could not be affected by
depreciation of the partnership assets. It was argued
that upon the deceased partner's death the firm owed
his estate more than $224,000.00 and that neither appraisal nor liquidation was necessary to ascertain the
amount of the claim. The court through Lehman, J.,
defined capital to consist of "money, required of the
partners by partnership agreement," taking the view
that sums voluntarily contributed for the use of the
partnership over and above that amount represented
an advance to the firm. The court said:
"To the extent that the partnership agreement
fails to impose an obligation on the partners to
furnish capital requisite for the conduct of the
business, the parties to the contract must intend
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that money will be borrowed to carry on the business and that interest will be paid on money borrowed. Therefore, where a partner pays Inoney
to the partnership beyond his partnership obligation, it is a reasonable inference that the parties
intended that such payment should be a loan
and should bear interest. * * *
"The items credited to Pratt's account [between partnership beginning and the death of
the partner] may not arbitrarily be characterized
as contributions to capital. They were not designated as such. It suggests itself that the other
partners would have been required to make proportiona~e contributions if they had regarded
Pratt's advances as capital. It is conceded that
no such payments were made."
The court held that the money due to Pratt was a
fixed debt and an obligation of the firm, and that Pratt's
personal representatives were clearly entitled to the
payments made to them.
It would appear that all of the sums contributed
by Rulon to the partnership after the date of the partnership, in the absence of some clear subsequent agreement that sums would be added to capital, were loans
to the partnership and were to be repaid before there
could be a distribution of assets. This would be true
regardless of the treatment to be given to beginning
capital.
The above cases, the partnership act, and the provisions of the partnership agreement all militate against
the construction of the trial court. Moreover, the parties themselves, prior to initiation of the present action,
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construed the agreement as providing for a return
of capital to Rulon. A contemporaneous construction
is found in the manner in which accountant Terry
showed the capital accounts on partnership books until
after dissolution. It is also found in the provisions of
the dissolution agreement (hereinafter discussed), and
in the scurrying of Terry's counsel to obtain an agreement on April 2, 1960, that Terry and Flora would
not be charged with any losses. This certainly would
not have been necessary if the trial court's construction
was correct, for the losses were to be borne by whomever contributed the most capital.

(c) Respondents are bound by the dissolution
agreement of A.pril 2, 1960, which required payment
of liabilities to partners on winding up of partnership
affairs.
The respondents in their answers to the complaint,
in the counterclaim of Terry, and in the answers to oral
interrogatories, have relied upon the dissolution agreement and supplemental agreement of April 2, 1960, as
creating some interest in them. Their contentions are
inconsistent in some respects: Flora says both that she
received the interest at the time of the articles of partnership and on April 2, 1960, while Terry has generally
taken the position that he received 40 per cent of Rulon
by virtue of the dissolution agreement. This contention
is reflected in the book entry referred to in the statement
of facts, charging about $90,000.00 against Rulon's
capital account on the basis of the agreement of April
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2, 1960. Regardless of Rulon's original contention as

to the binding effect of the agreements of April :l,
1960, the agreements ought to be binding upon the
defendants, either as an aid to construction of the partnership or as operative agreements themselves. Terry
has pleaded the agreements and Flora, in her answer,
has stated that she fully ratified, accepted, and confirmed them.
Paragraph 1 of the dissolution agreement provides:
"The winding up of the partnership affairs
shall consist of selling all real and personal property of the partnership, paying all partnership
liabilities (including liabilities to partners) and
distributing the net assets of the partnership in
cash to the parties hereto in the following proportion:
J

Rulon R. West
Terry R. West
Flora E. West

407o
407o
207o

"When all the net assets of the partnership
have been distributed in cash in accordance with
the preceding sentence, the winding up of the
partnership affairs shall be completed." (Emphasis added.)
"Liabilities to partners" is clear enough. In subparagraph (2) of 48-1-37 Utah Code Annotated 1953
there is a reference to three classes of liabilities to partners: those owing other than for capital and profits,
those owing in respect of capital, and those owing in
respect of profits. There is no reason to suppose that
34
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the parties meant to adopt a different meaning for
"liabilities to partners," and under the terms of the
dissolution agreement it was incumbent upon the court
to order payment of liabilities to partners prior to distribution of the remaining assets.
(d) Neither the articles of partnership nor the
supplemental agreement of April 2, 1960, operates as
a gift to the respondents of appellant's property.

The trial court must have asked itself this question:
What kind of businessman of ordinary acumen would
enter into a contract by the terms of which 607o of all
his contributions to a partnership would, ipso facto,
vest in his co-partners (neither of whom had any substantial funds to contribute themselves) ? And given
itself this answer: King Lear or Santa Claus. For the
court seemed reluctant to interpret the partnership
contract, qua contract, as accomplishing what the summary judgment accomplished. Prior to entering the
judgment the court said (R. 106):
"All right, then, gentlemen, my order will be
that the contract be construed that as of the second day of April, 1960, both of the Messrs. West
have a 40 per cent interest, Terry by way of a
gift, and that Flora has a 20 per cent interest
by way of a gift, and that the distribution of the
assets after the payment of debts to outsiders be
on this basis."
The court did not make it clear what it relied upon
as constituting the "gift" of the 40 per cent interest to
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Terry and the 20 per cent interest to Flora, but it must
have been either the partnership agreement or the
supplemental agreement of April 2, 1960. We sub1nit
that neither satisfies the requirements of a valid inter
vivos gift.
The courts have consistently affirmed that a valid
gift requires an "unmistakable intention" of the donor
to make a gift, coupled with such delivery as the nature
of the property permits. 24 Am. Jur., Gifts, §§ 21-27.
There are no enforceable promises to make gifts. Id.,
§ 23.

In Holman v. Deseret Savings Bank et al.~ 41 Utah
340, 124 Pac. 765 (1912), the court had the following
to say about the requisites of an inter vivos gift:
"Gifts inter vivos have no reference to the
future, and go into the immediate and absolute
effect. To constitute such a gift, the donor must
be divested of, and the donee invested with, the
right of property in the subject of the gift. It
must be absolute, irrevocable, without any reference to its taking place at some future period.
The donor must deliver the property in part with
all present and future dominion over it."
And in Christensen v. Ogden State Bank~ 75 Utah
478, 286 Pac. 638 ( 1930), this court again recognized
that there can be no "executory gift."
At the time of execution of the articles the capital
of the partnership consisted of an equity in a real estate
contract and $1,000 cash, both contributed by Rulon.
Assuming that the articles could be taken (without
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regard to surrounding disputed facts) to show an "un..
mistakable intention" to make a gift, what was or could
have been given? An interest in beginning capital? An
interest in any amounts thereafter contributed or loaned
by Rulon? Or would the rights of respondents in subsequent payments depend upon the intent existing at
the time property or money was delivered? And if a
later intent were important, could it have been determined as a matter of law?
The articles of partnership should not have been
interpreted as making any gift, and could not be interpreted as making a gift of amounts to be paid in by
Rulon in the future - which amounts weren't even
promised.
Moreover, the evidence is shadowy as to whether
there was any gift when the articles were signed. Flora
says both that there was and wasn't. Terry claimed a
gift only in the dissolution agreement and supplement, a
fact borne out by his accounting treatment of capital, and
his post-dissolution "adjustment" of Rulon's capital
account by transfer of approximately $90,000.00 to
himself and Flora.
But the transactions of April 2, 1960, cannot be
held to constitute a gift, for there was neither "unmistakable intention" nor delivery. Indeed, the supplemental agreement doesn't even identify the property
that has been or is being given, and is phrased in terms
of a bargain for consideration.
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The supplemental agreement that Terry's attorney
prevailed upon Rulon to sign is entitled "Agreement,"
and describes itself as being a "supplemental" to the
Dissolution Agreement then being negotiated. It states
that the parties have "mutually agreed" as to certain
matters. In paragraph I, without showing what "40
per cent" is being talked about, the agreement provides
that Rulon "agrees" that the contribution with respect
to "the " 40 per cent interest acquired by Terry West
was and is a gift, and that Rulon will (prospectively)
file a gift tax return. In paragraph 2, he agrees to
absorb all losses suffered by the partnership. And in
paragraph 3, Rulon "certifies" that "the" interest
acquired by Flora was also by virtue of a gift. We
submit that the supplemental agreement does not
qualify as a binding agreement upon Rulon because
not given for consideration. It is not capable of construction contended for by respondents because such
a construction is repugnant to plain language of the
agreement supplemented, and the language of the
agreement can be construed so as not to create such
inconsistenecy. The supplemental agreement appears
to be an attempt on the part of Terry to obtain an
unjustifiable tax benefit in event there were a surplus.
(If the trial court was relying on the supplemental
agreement, it did give Rulon one advantage. To be
consistent with its application of 40-40-20, it should
have required Rulon to pay into the partnership an
amount necessary to increase the capital-if there had
been a loss-to the greatest amount he had contributed.
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Otherwise, respondents might not receive their full
60<j'o.)
The supplemental agreement does not purport to
be a deed of gift and contains no word of assignment
or transfer, failing to identify the property "transferred." At most, it is an agreement as to the method
of treatment to be given to a transaction concluded in
the past (or contemporaneously with the supplemental
agreement) . It· is inconceivable how the trial court
could have construed the supplemental agreement as a
gift of 60 per cent of Rulon's interest in the partnership-not only 60 per cent of the original contribution
made in 1957, but 60 per cent of all contributions made
thereafter, and 60 per cent of all loans made to the
partnership, as well as 60 per cent of all of the interest
to which he was entitled, and 60 per cent of all indistributed profits.
In Jones et al v.

Cook~ 118

Utah 562, 223 P.2d

423 ( 1950) , this court adopted the view that there must

be a "clear and unmistakable intention" on the part
of the donor to make a gift, and that the gift must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence. The donee
has the burden of proving the gift. Blonde v. Jenkins~
Estate~ 130 Cal. App.2d 682, 281 P.2d 14 (1955).
We submit that on the basis of evidence found in
the depositions and answers to interrogatories, and the
statements in the pleadings, a finding of a gift by Rulon
to Flora and Terry of 60 per cent of his interest in the
partnership "would lack the support of clear and con-
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vincing evidence." lVIoreover, in this case the court
never arrived at fact-finding stage. It determined as
a matter of law that there are no facts in dispute which
could have a bearing upon whether a gift had been, or
upon the extent of that gift.
We recognize that the kind of property involved
in a partnership may not admit of actual delivery. But
it does admit of a less equivocal delivery than had found
sufficient by the trial court. The kinds of delivery
necessary to constitute a valid gift of a debt to the
debtor (essentially our situation) are discussed at length
in the annotation, "Gift of Debt to Debtor," beginning
at 63 A.L.R.2d 259. Most enlightening are the cases
on page 472 dealing with gifts of partnership interests,
where the courts have looked for delivery in some unambiguous action with respect to the partnership books.
In the present case there has been no assignment,
and no direction on the part of the claimed donor to
make book entries to reflect the "gift." The book entry
made by Terry was his own idea, made two or more
months after the April 2 agreement, without Rulon's
knowledge.

II

The court erred in withholding from the specia;
master determination of the capital accounts of the
partners and the interest due on capital invested in and
loans made to the partnership.
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At the time of appointment of the special master
an order was prepared and submitted to the court which
would have required the master to determine the state
of the capital accounts and arrive at a determination
of the interest due to Rulon R. West on the amounts
that were standing in his capital account. The provision
for this determination was stricken by the trial court
(R. 146), after which the plaintiff moved that the order
be amended to provide for a determination of capital
contributions and interest (R. 148), but the motion was
denied.
Insofar as the order related to a determination of
capital contributions for the purpose of distribution
on a 40-40-20 basis, the action of the court was consistent with its interlocultory summary judgment. But
the summary judgment did not purport to make a
determination of the interest on contributions to which
any of the parties was entitled under the plain terms
of the partnership agreement.
It does not require extensive discussion to show the
error of the court in this respect. The partnership
articles were clear on interest. We need refer only to
paragraph 4:
"Interest at the rate of five per cent ( 5lfo)
per annum shall be paid to each partner on the
capital for the time being standing to his credit
out of the gross profits of the business, and such
interest shall be cumulative, so that any deficiency in one year shall be made up out of the
gross profits of any succeeding year or years."
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CONCLUSION
The plaintiff should have had judgment as a matter
of law that he was entitled to a return of his contributions, interest on them, and loans to the partnership
prior to a distribution of the remaining P,artnership
assets. The partnership articles, if read in their entirety,
lead inescapably to the conclusion that the contributions
of partners were to be treated as contributions are
treated in other partnerships-that is, they were to be
repaid.
A construction that the partnership articles contemplated a return of capital is buttressed by the contemporaneous construction of the parties. It is undisputed that Terry West, the accountant, kept the
partnership books in such a manner as to show a
capital account for Rulon, and that he placed into the
capital account various amounts contributed or lent
to the partnership by Rulon. On about April 2, 1960,
when the parties negotiated and signed a dissolution
agreement (later ratified by Flora) it was expressly
provided that the liabilities to partners would be paid
before the net assets were distributed in the proportions
of 40-40-20. As an adjunct to this dissolution agreement there was a supplemental agreement which, possibly, was interpreted by the trial court as a "gift" of
something or other. But the supplemental agreement
deals only with the method of treating something which
it is assumed the other parties already had received.
Patently, it is directed at a tax savings for Terry. It
42
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refers only to "the" 40 per cent interest without setting
out what it is 40 per cent of. The parties must have
assumed that the extent of those interests were determinable by reference to other documents. The only
other documents are the articles of partnership and
the dissolution agreement, both of which must be construed as providing for a return of capital, for a payment by the partnership of liabilities to partners prior
to distribution of assets.
But not only did the trial court refuse to enter a
summary judgment in the plaintiff's behalf (which
judgment was plainly dictated by the terms of the instruments before the trial court and by the testimony
and admissions of the respondents) it violated rules of
reason and right to trial by holding, as a matter of law,
that appellant had lost 60 per cent of his property.
Whether he contributed it as capital, or loaned it, or
whether Terry had (as contended by Rulon) promised
to execute notes in behalf of the partnership as evidence
of the loans made by Rulon, made no difference to
the trial court. The trial court not only took away from
Rulon and gave to respondents the money he contributed
as capit~l and loaned to the partnership, but excised
from the partnership agreement the provision as to
payment of interest, and held, in effect, that Rulon
would be entitled to profits from operations of the
partnership only if he succeeded in getting them away
from Terry prior to dissolution.
It is submitted that if the plaintiff is not entitled
to judgment as a matter of law at least there are fact
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issues concerning the purposes for which money was
advanced to the partnership after the date of the articles
of partnership, the meaning and effect of the agreements of April2, 1960, and the question of whether the
supplemental agreement was to be conditional upon
the respondent Terry West making a satisfactory
arrangement with Rulon West to pay for his remaining
interest in the partnership. The case, to that extent, has
issues of fact which should be tried. The court committed
plain error in ruling in the summary judgment that
the plaintiff was not entitled to return of his contributions, loans, interest, and undistributed profit, and in
construing a completely ambiguous and equivocal
"supplemental agreement" to constitute a gift-a construction repugnant to the dissolution agreement to
which it was supplemental, and to the articles of partnership theretofore executed by the parties.
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed
and a decree entered directing that the receiver repay
to Rulon R. West his capital contributions, loans, interest, and undistributed profits before making any
distribution of the net assets of the partnership.
Respectfully submitted,
Bryce E. Roe
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City I, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
-Appellant
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APPENDIX "A"
ARTICLES OF PARTNERSHIP
This AGREEMENT, made and entered into as of the 15th day
of October, A.D. 1957, by RULON R. WEST, TERRY R. WEST
and FLORA E. WEST,-WITNESSETH:
That the above named parties have associated themselves as
partners under the firm name of EL RANCHO ENTERPRISES for
the purposes and on the conditions herein recited:
1. The partnership business shall be that of operating motels,
auto camps, trailer camps, tourist camps and allied businesses and
shall be carried on at 5203 South State Street, in Murray City, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, or at such other place or places as the
partners may from time to time agree upon.

2. Said partnership shall continue until dissolved by the mutual
consent of the partners or terminated by operation of law.

3. The capital of the partnership shall consist of the following
property:
(a) A real estate contract covering the purchase by the partnership and the sale by Reed P. Mortensen and Ann S. Mortensen,
his wife, of the Murray El Rancho Motel, including approximately
four ( 4) acres of real property situated at 5203 South State Street,
in Murray City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, including the personal property located in the sixteen motel units situated upon said
real property upon which contract the said Rulon R. West has paid
the sum of $47,500.00 and the sum of $1,000.00 cash in bank account
also furnisped by the said Rulon R. West.
(b) Any further sums which any partner shall with the consent of the other from time to time contribute for capital purposes
which shall be credited to his capital account.
4. Interest at the rate of five per cent ( 5%) per annum shall be
paid to each partner on the capital for the time being standing to his
credit out of the gross profits of the business, and such interest shall
be cumulative, so that any deficiency in one year shall be made up out
of the gross profits of any succeeding year or years.
5. The said Terry R. West shall be the Manager of the partnership business and shall be entitled to draw up to but not exceeding
the sum of $500.00 per month for his services, all amounts so drawn
t? be charged as a partnership expense and deducted before any diviston of net profits is made.
v
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6. The net profits of the business shall be divided between the
partners in the following proportions: Rulon R. West, forty per cent
( 40%); Terry R. West, forty per cent ( 40%) and Flora E. West
twenty per cent (20%); and the partners shall in like proportion
bear all losses, including loss of capital.
7. The usual books of account shall be kept properly posted up,
and shall not be removed from the place of business without the
consent of all partners. Each partner shall have free access to them
at all times, and shall be at liberty to make such extracts therefrom
as he may think fit.

8. On the 15th day of October, A.D. 1958 and on the 15th
day of October in each succeeding year during the continuation of the
partnership, an account shall be taken of all the capital, assets and
liabilities for the time being of the partnership, and a balance sheet
and profit and loss account making due allowance for depreciation and
for recouping any lost capital shall be prepared and a copy thereof
furnished to each partner. At any time agreed upon by all of the
partners, after the preparation of the said balance sheet and profit and
loss account, the net profits, if any, shown by such account may be
divided in the proportions set forth in paragraph 6 above hereof.
9. The partners agree: (a) That Terry R. West shall diligently
attend to the business and devote such portion of his time thereto as
is necessary to properly and economically operate said business. (b)
each partner shall punctually pay his separate debts and indemnify
the other partners and the assets of the partnership against the same
and all expenses on account thereof; (c) each partner shall forthwith
pay all moneys, checks, and negotiable instruments received by him on
account of the firm into the bank or banks selected by the partners to the
firm account; (d) each partner shall be just and faithful to the other
partners, and at all times give to such other partners full information
and truthful explanations of all matters relating to the affairs of the
partnership, and afford every assistance in his power in carrying on
the business for their mutual advantage.
10. No partner shall without the consent of the others (a) Lend
any of the moneys or deliver upon credit any of the goods of the firm
to any person or persons whom the other partners shall have previously
in writing forbidden him to trust; (b) Give any security or promise
for the payment of money on account of the firm unless in the ordinary
course of business; (c) enter into any bond, or become bail, indorser,
or surety for any person, or knowingly cause or suffer to be done
anything whereby the partnership property may be seized, attached,
or taken on execution or endangered; (d) assign, mortgage, or charge
his share in the assets or profits of the partnership, or any part of such
vi
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share; (e) draw, accept, or indorse any bill of exchange or promissory
note on account of the firm; (f) sign any checkon behalf of the firm
for a sum exceeding $500.00; (g) buy, order, or contract for any
goods or property exceeding the value of $500.00 on behalf of the
partnership; (h) cot?promise, or compound, or, except up~n payment
in full, release or dtscharge any debt due to the partnershtp.
11. If any partner shall die during the continuance of the said
partnership, the survivors or survivor may purchase the share of the
deceased partner in the capital and assets of the business on the following terms: (a) The purchase price shall be the amount at which
such share shall stand in the last balance sheet which shall have been
prepared prior to the death of said partner plus ten per cent (10%)
thereof; (b) such purchase of any deceased partner's interest, if made
by the surviving partners or partner, shall be effected within one year
from the date of death, and in addition to the purchase money, the
surviving partners or partner shall pay a sum equal to interest on the
amount of said purchase price computed from the date of the then
last preceding annual account up to the date of death of the deceased
at the rate of 5% per annum in lieu both of interest on capital, including any arrears of such interest for preceding years, and profits
during such period, credit being given for any sums drawn out by the
deceased partner during the then current year.
12. If the surviving partners or partner shall not exercise the
option of purchasing the share and interest of the deceased partner,
or if the partnership shall be determined or expire during the joint
lives of the partners, then the partnership shall be wound up, and the
assets distributed in the proportions set forth in paragraph 6 above
hereof.

13. All rents, taxes, costs of repairs, alterations, or improvements, insurance and all other costs, charges and expenses which shall
be incurred in or about the business or in any wise relating thereto,
and all losses which shall happen in respect to the business, shall be
paid out of the income or capital of the partnership, and in case of
any deficiency thereof by the partners in the proportions set forth in
paragraph 6 above hereof.
14. Notwithstanding the death of any partner, the partnership
between the surviving partners shall continue under these articles
of partnership.
15. At the end or sooner determination of the partnership the
partners, each to the other, shall make a true, just and final account
of all things relating to their said business, and in all things adjust
the same; and all stock, as well as the gains and increases thereof,
vii
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including all real and personal property, which shall appear to be
remaining, either in money, goods, wares, fixtures, debts or otherwise,
shall be divided between them in the proportions set forth in paragraph
6 above hereof.
16. Any decisions and major arrangements required or necessary
in the operation of said business which are not in the ordinary course
of operations shall only be made and effected by and with the unanimous agreement and consent of all the partners.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the partners above named have hereunto set their hands and seals the day and year first above written.
Is /Rulon R. West
jsj Terry R. West
jsj Flora West
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
STATE OF UTAH
) 55
On the 1st day of October, A.D. 1957 personally appeared before
me the said Rulon R. West, Terry R. West and Flora E. West, signers
of the above instrument, who duly severally acknowledged to me that
they executed the same.
Paul S. Roberts
Notary Public
(Seal)
Residing at Murray City, Utah
My Commission Expires:
Sept. 10, 1959

APPENDIX "B"
AGREEMENT
AGREEMENT made this ·--- day of ----------------------------, 1960, by
and between RULON R. WEST, FLORA E. WEST, and TERRY R.
WEST.
WHEREAS, the parties hereto are partners under those certain
Articles of Partnership dated the 15th day of October, 1957, and
WHEREAS, said partnership has been and is hereby declared
to be dissolved, and
WHEREAS, the parties hereto desire to make an agreement with
respect to certain matters pertaining to the winding up of the partnership affairs,
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto agree that Rulon R.
West and Terry R. West shall have authority to wind up the partner·
viii
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ship affairs, shall concur in all matters pertaining to the winding up
of the partnership affairs, and shall proceed to wind up the partnership
affairs in accordance with the following provisions:
1. Elements and Completion of Winding Up. The winding up
of the partnership affairs shall consist of selling all real and personal
property of the partnership, paying all partnership liabilities ( including liabilities to partners) , and distributing the net assets of the
partnership in cash to the parties hereto in the following proportions:

Rulon R. West
Terry R. West
Flora E. West

40%
40%
20%

When all the net assets of the partnership have been distributed in
cash in accordance with the preceding sentence, the winding up of the
partnership affairs shall be completed .
. 2. Operation of Partnership Business Pending Sale. Each business of the partnership shall be operated until such time as such business is sold. Rulon R. West and Terry R. West and Flora West shall
concur in all management decisions pertaining to the operation of
said businesses. Terry R. West shall diligently attend to the business
in the daily operation of the businesses, which operation shall include
the renting of accommodations, the maintenance of all partnership
property, including the interior and exterior of all buildings, rental
units, signs, fences, sidewalks, driveways and other real and personal
property of the partnership, in good· repair, working order and appearance, and the maintenance of the motel and trailer camp premises,
including the lawn, shrubbery and trees, in a state of good, neat and
attractive appearance, having such assistance as is reasonably necessary
to accomplish same. Terry R. West shall receive reasonable and periodic
compensation for his services pertaining to the daily operation of the
businesses, which compensation shall be on the same basis as heretofore taken and no additional compensation unless said compensation
is agreed upon from [time} to time by all of the parties hereto.

3. Receipts and Disbursements. All receipts obtained from operations of the motel, trailer sales, and trailer park shall be deposited
in the usual account and checked out only for payment of employees
salaries, utilities, and ordinary expenses, including expenses to Terry
R. West as above specified. All receipts involving sales of capital
assets or realization from trailer sales where equities aside from the
obligation and any other capital assets sales shall be placed in a special
bank account, from which no proceeds can be taken except over the
signatures of Terry R. West and Rulon R. West, or instead of Rulon
R. West, Leroy E. Holmes.
ix
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4. Sale of Partnership Property. All partnership property, including the good will, shall be sold as soon and for a price as near to the
fair market value thereof as is reasonably possible under the circumstances. Any offer for the purchase of any part or all of the partnership
property which is made by a reasonably dependable and solvent
offeror, on reasonable terms and for a reasonable amount shall be
accepted. No property shall be accepted in trade as either part or
full payment for the purchase of part or all of the partnership property
unless such property can be expected to be sold with reasonable promptness at a price equal or in excess of the value for which it was accepted
in trade. The sale of the partnership property shall be advertised in a
reasonable manner, consistent with the desires to make a sale with
reasonable promptness and to attract the attention of as many as
possible of those persons who would and could qualify as purchasers.
5. Distribution of Partnership Assets. The parties hereto shall
determine from time to time during the period of the winding up of
the partnership affairs the amount of the partnership assets which
may be distributed to the parties hereto in cash in the proportions
specified in Paragraph 1 hereof, taking into consideration the absolute
and contingent liabilities of the partnership.
6. Statements. On or before the 3rd day of April, 1960, and each
six ( 6) months therafter until the winding up of the partnership
affairs is completed, Terry R. West shall prepare and shall distribute
to each of the parties hereto an accurate, detailed and complete statement of all partnership assets, liabilities, receipts and disbursements.
The partnership books shall be kept current by Terry R. West. Each
of the parties hereto shall have access to the partnership books at any
reasonable time.
7. Authority of Leroy E. Holmes. At all times during which
Rulon R. West is away from Salt Lake City, Utah, during the period
of the winding up of the partnership affairs, Leroy E. Holmes, of
1381 Brookshire Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, shall, so long as he is
in possession of a written and effective power of attorney from Rulon
R. West, have the right to act for and in behalf of Rulon R. West
in all matters pertaining to the winding up of the partnership affairs,
and shall have all the rights, powers and privileges which Rulon R.
West has under this agreement.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have hereunto sub·
scribed their names the day and year first above written.
/ s /Rulon R. West
/s/ Flora West
/s/ Terry R. West
X
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COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
STATE OF UTAH

)

55

On the 31st day of March, 1960, personally appeared before me
RULON R. WEST, one of the signers of the within and foregoing
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Jane Roberts
Notary Public
Residing at Salt Lake County, Utah
My commission expires:
April 9, 1961

APPENDIX "C"
AGREEMENT
This supplemental agreement to the dissolution agreement made
and entered into the 2nd day of April, 1960, wherein it is mutually
agreed as follows:
1. The contribution made by Rulon R. West with respect to the
40 per cent interest acquired by Terry R. West was and is a gift from
Rulon R. West to Terry R. West, and Rulon R. West does agree to
file a gift tax return in connection therewith so stating.

2. Should the motel or the businesses be sold at a loss wherein
the net recoveries are less than the sums due thereon, all loss will be
absorbed and paid by Rulon R. West.

3. The undersigned, Rulon R. West, further certifies that the
interest in the El Rancho Enterprises was not only a gift to Terry
R. West, but also to Flora West and their interests were acquired by
virtue of the gift.

Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 2nd day of April, 1960.

Is

/Rulon R. West
jsj Terry R. West
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